ABSTRACT In this paper, we propose to use self-sustained jammers to generate artificial noise with the aim of enhancing the physical layer security of a directional modulation (DM) relay system. To this end, we specifically tackle an optimization problem of designing beamforming vectors at the source, relay, and jammers to maximize a lower bound on the average secrecy rate of the considered system. Due to that the optimization problem is non-convex and the optimization variables are coupled, and so we cannot directly solve this problem. As such, we first develop a centralized scheme to achieve the near-optimal beamforming vectors with the aid of semidefinite relaxation, successive convex approximation, and an alternating iterative algorithm. The tightness of the incurred relaxation and the convergence of the involved algorithm are proved. To reduce the overhead and complexity of the centralized scheme, we also develop two decentralized schemes with partial cooperation and without cooperation among devices to obtain suboptimal beamforming vectors. Our examination shows that the developed centralized scheme can achieve similar performance as the optimal beamforming vectors, which can only be obtained through exhaustive numerical search. Our examination also specifies the conditions under which the decentralized schemes can achieve similar or significantly worse performance relative to the centralized scheme. Furthermore, our examination demonstrates that the developed three schemes are robust to the angle estimation errors in practical DM systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, wireless powered communication networks have gained much attention due to their desired ability of selfsustainable power supplies [1] , [2] . In traditional wireless networks, transceivers are normally powered by physically embedded batteries, which are not always convenient to recharge or replace. This may cause power supply problems in the context of traditional wireless networks. For example, in some applications such as security or environment surveillance scenarios, many power-constrained relays are deployed with the aim of either enhancing security or extending the area being monitored, while recharging or replacing the batteries of these relay nodes may be impossible or economically impractical. Fortunately, this problem can be solved by the emerging energy harvesting (EH) techniques [3] . With regard to EH, the power-constrained devices can convert surrounding radio frequency (RF) signals to current electricity and the harvested energy can help the devices support wireless communications for a longer time [4] , [5] .
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless medium, confidential information exchanged over wireless networks is easy to be overheard or decoded by unintended receivers, known as eavesdroppers [6] - [9] . Therefore, privacy and security issues have become the major concerns for wireless communication applications. Against this background, cooperative jamming (CJ) with EH-enabled relays is considered to be an effective way to improve communication security with no extra energy cost. For example, decode-and-forward (DF) relaying networks based on EH were investigated in [10] , while a wireless cooperative scheme with multiple sourcedestination pairs communicate via an EH relay was proposed in [11] . A full-duplex relay uses the energy harvested from the source for CJ to improve the security was studied in [12] . The self-energy cycle of a cooperative jammer was studied in [13] , where a sufficient condition of the cooperative jammer being a reliable energy supply node was derived. In [14] , a cooperative communication scheme using an EH-enabled relay to enhance physical layer security was examined, where the source charges the jammer in the first time slot and in the second time slot the source sends confidential information while the jammer uses the harvested energy to create interference to the eavesdropper. In [15] , the beamforming vectors for amplify-and forward (AF) relay and multiple self-sustained jammers were designed to improve the system secrecy performance. In [16] , in order to motivate relays to generate jamming signals, EH was taken as an incentive method for CJ.
Directional modulation (DM) has attracted a wide attention as a new type of physical layer security technology [17] - [20] . Compared with traditional beamforming techniques, DM can transmit confidential information to a specific desired direction, while disturbing constellations in other undesired directions [21] - [26] . For example, Daly and Bernhard [21] proposed a DM modulation technique that adjusts the amplitude and phase of each symbol by controlling the phase shift of each array element. Artificial noise (AN) was introduced into the DM system and synthesis in [22] , where it was shows that the secrecy performance of the system can be greatly improved by projecting AN into the null space of the desired direction. Ding and Fusco [23] extended the orthogonal vectors method into a multi-cast DM system. In [24] , a robust and secure DM system was designed by assuming that the estimation error of the steering angle follows a uniform distribution. Following [24] , Shu et al. [25] considered the direction angle estimation error in a broadcast scenario and used leaking concepts to design a robust secure beamforming. Then, the authors designed a robust beamforming scheme for multi-user DM systems based on main-lobe-integration method in [26] .
Although a large number of works have considered the energy self-sustained techniques in the context of traditional beamforming schemes to enhance physical layer security and the DM technology has also been widely studied to improve physical layer security, to the best knowledge of the authors, the energy-sustaining technology has not been considered in the context of DM system to enhance physical layer security. In traditional DM systems with the consideration of security, confidential information and AN signals are transmitted simultaneously by a transmitter, where the AN signals are transmitted at the cost of reducing the transmit power of the confidential information signals. When there are selfsustained jammers in the DM security system, the transmitter can only transmit confidential information signals, while the AN signals are generated by the self-sustained jammers, which is conducive to simultaneously improve energy efficiency and communication security. As such, in this work we consider a DM security system, where a multi-antenna source transmits confidential information to a destination with the aid of a multi-antenna relay and multiple friendly self-sustained jammers, each of which is equipped with multiple antennas. The main contributions of this work are summarized as below.
• For the first time, we introduce a DF relay and selfsustained jammers into a DM system to extend its application scenarios and enhance its secrecy performance. In this context, our objective is to design the beamforming vectors at the source, relay, and jammers to enhance the secrecy performance of the considered system. To this end, we first develop a centralized scheme (i.e., the CS scheme), where we decompose the optimization problem of maximizing a derived lower bound on average secrecy rate with optimal beamforming vectors into two subproblems. We first show that the first subproblem can be equivalently transformed into an energy harvesting problem, which is solved by the semidefinite relaxation (SDR) technique. In addition, we find a near-optimal solution to the second subproblem by employing the successive convex approximation (SCA) technique. Following this, we propose an alternating iterative algorithm to solve the original optimization problem by solving the two subproblems alternatively and prove its convergence.
• To reduce the overhead and the computational complexity of the CS scheme, we also develop a decentralized scheme with partial cooperation (i.e., the DSWPC scheme) to design these beamforming vectors. Specifically, in the DSWPC scheme the beamforming vectors for the confidential information signal and energycarrying signal at the source and the beamforming vector for the AN signal at each jammer are independently designed and their analytical expressions are derived. Meanwhile, in the DSWPC scheme the design of the beamforming vector at the relay requires each jammer to share the determined beamforming vector, which leads the required cooperation between the relay and jammers. We note that this cooperation costs a larger amount of the information exchanged between these devices as the number of jammers or each jammer's antenna number increases. In order to avoid this cost, we further develop a decentralized scheme without cooperation (i.e., the DSWOC scheme), where beamforming vectors at different devices are independently designed.
• Our proposed three schemes, i.e., the CS, DSWPC, and DSWOC schemes, can balance well between the design complexity and system performance. Our examination shows that the developed CS scheme can achieve 970 VOLUME 7, 2019 similar performance as the optimal beamforming vectors, which can only be obtained through exhaustive numerical search. In addition, the DSWPC scheme can possibly achieve similar performance as the CS scheme under specific conditions, e.g., with a large transmit power at the source. Furthermore, as we show that the performance gap between the DSWPC and DSWOC schemes only dominates in some specific scenarios, e.g., with a large number of antennas at the relay or each jammer. Finally, we show that the developed three schemes are robust to the angle estimation errors, which always exist in practical DM systems. The reminder of this work is organized as follows. In Section II and Section III, we present the considered system model and formulate an optimization problem to design beamforming vectors at the source, relay, and jammers. In Section IV and Section V, we develop a centralized scheme and two decentralized schemes to tackle the optimization problem formulated in Section III. Section VI provides our numerical results to examine the secrecy performance of the three developed schemes and Section VII draws conclusion remarks.
Notation: Boldface lowercase and uppercase letters represent vectors and matrices, respectively, A T , A H , and A 0 denote transpose, conjugate transpose, and semidefiniteness of matrix A, respectively. E[·], and · denote the statistical expectation, and Euclidean norm, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL A. ADOPTED ASSUMPTIONS
We consider a secure wireless communication system, which consists of a source (S), a relay (R), M EH-enabled friendly jammers J (J {J 1 , · · · , J M }), a destination (D), and an eavesdropper (E) as shown in Fig. 1 . We assume that there is no direct link from the source to the destination or from the source to the eavesdropper due to existing obstacles. The source sends the confidential messages to the destination with the aid of the relay that operates in the DF mode and M energy self-sustained friendly jammers to prevent the eavesdropper from intercepting these confidential messages. It is assumed that each of the destination and eavesdropper is equipped with a single antenna, while the source, the relay, and each jammer are equipped with the uniform linear antenna arrays with N S , N R , and N J elements, respectively.
Following [24] and [25] , the steering matrix between the node S and the node T (T ∈ {R, J }) is given by
where g ST denotes the path loss from node S to node T , θ D and θ A represent the angle-of-departure and angle-ofarrival from S to T , respectively. Likewise, the steering vector between node T and node U (U ∈ {D, E}) is given by
where g T U denotes the path loss from node T to node U and θ T U represents the direction angle between T and U.
In this work, we assume that the source, the relay, and the m-th jammer can perfectly obtain the direction angles θ SR , θ SJ m , θ RD , and θ J m D , respectively. While the relay and the mth jammer have estimation errors on the direction angles to the eavesdropper. As such, θ RE and θ J m E can be modeled as
whereθ RE andθ J m E denote the estimated angles from the relay and the m-th jammer to the eavesdropper, respectively, and θ RE and θ J m E represent their estimation errors. We note that, the direction angles can generally be estimated by the high-resolution and low-complexity ROOT-MUSIC method [20] . In this work, we assume that the estimated angles together with the covariance matrices of h(θ RE ) and h(θ J m E ) are known, based on which we develop robust and secure beamforming strategies at the source, relay, and jammers.
B. TRANSMISSION FROM SOURCE TO DESTINATION
In this work, we assume that the relay works in the halfduplex mode. Therefore, the source requires two time slots to send the confidential messages to the destination. In the first time slot, the source transmits the confidential information and energy to the DF relay and M jammers, respectively. The transmitted signal at the source can be expressed as
where p and q = L l=1 q l x l (L ≤ N S ) denote the confidential information beamforming vector and the sum of L energy VOLUME 7, 2019 beams, respectively, q l denotes the l-th energy beamforming vector, and x 0 and x l are the confidential information signal and energy-carrying signal, respectively, which satisfy E[|x 0 | 2 ] = 1 and E[|x l | 2 ] = 1. We note that p and q are not normalized here, since we also use them to determine the power allocation at the source.
The received signals at the relay and the harvested energy at the m-th jammer in the first time slot are given by
and
respectively, where 0 < η ≤ 1 denotes the energy transfer efficiency and n R is the Additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) vector, i.e., n R ∼ CN (0, σ 2 R I N R ). In the second time slot, the relay decodes the received information signals and forwards them to the destination, while the M jammers simultaneously use the energy harvested in the first time slot to generate AN signals to confuse the eavesdropper. As such, the received signals at the destination and the eavesdropper are given by
where v ∈ C N R ×1 and w m ∈ C N J ×1 denote the information beamforming vector at the relay and the AN beamforming vector at the m-th jammer, respectively, n D and n E represent AWGN at the destination and the eavesdropper, following CN (0, σ 2 D ) and CN (0, σ 2 E ), respectively, z m denotes the AN signal that is generated by the m-th jammer and follows the circular symmetric complex Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit variance. Without loss of generality, in this work we assume that
III. DESIGN CRITERION AND THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM OF INTEREST
In this section, we determine a lower bound on the average secrecy rate as our design criterion, based on which we present the considered optimization problem of designing beamforming vectors at the source, relay, and jammers.
A. A LOWER BOUND ON THE AVERAGE SECRECY RATE
Following (6), the maximum achievable rate from the source to the relay in the first time slot can be expressed as [2] 
where I N R ∈ C N R ×N R . According to (8) and (9), the maximum achievable rates from the relay to the destination and from the relay to the eavesdropper can be expressed as
respectively. We note that the maximum achievable end-to-end rate from the source to the destination is the minimum of R sr and R rd , i.e., R d min{R sr , R rd }. We would like to clarify that R sr ≥ R rd is always guaranteed in our considered system model, such that R d = R rd . This is due to the fact that, if R sr < R rd , the relay will reduce its transmit power to decrease the information leakage to the eavesdropper while R d min{R sr , R rd } is not affected. Therefore, the maximum achievable secrecy rate of the considered system model is given by [27] 
We note that the secrecy rate given in (13) is a function of the unknown angles θ RE and θ J m E , which is unknown and cannot be our design criterion. In this context, the average secrecy rate, which is obtained by averaging R s over the unknown angles θ RE and θ J m E , i.e., R s = E[R s ], can be a design criterion. However, in the considered system model the expression of this average secrecy rate is mathematically intractable. As such, in the following we determine a lower bound on the average secrecy rate as our design criterion (objective function in our optimization problem). Based on the Jensen's inequality, the lower bound on the average secrecy rate is given by [28] 
where we recall that H RE and H J m E denote the covariance matrices of the steering vectors h(θ RE ) and h(θ J m E ), respectively. In the following, we will formulate an optimization problem to design the beamforming vectors p, {q l } L l=1 , v, and {w m } M m=1 , with this lower bound R lb s as the objective function. We would like to clarify that the average secrecy rate or its lower bound can only be adopted as a design criterion, which cannot be solely adopted as the secrecy performance metric of the considered system model. This is due to the fact that secrecy outages would occur in the system model where the eavesdropper's exact channel state information is not available.
B. OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM OF INTEREST
In this subsection, we formulate an optimization problem to design the beamforming vectors at the source, relay, and jammers that maximize the lower bound on the average secrecy rate given in (14) , where the constraint R sr ≥ R rd and the transmit power constraints at the source, relay, and jammers are considered. Mathematically, the optimization problem of interest is given by (P1) :
where m ∈ M, the constraint (15b) is to guarantee R sr ≥ R rd , P S and P R are the maximum transmit power at the source and the DF relay, respectively, (15c), (15e), and (15d) represent the maximum transmit power constraints at the source, relay, and each jammer, respectively, and the right-hand-side (RHS) of (15d) denotes the harvested energy by the m-jammer in the first time slot as per (7). We note that, in the optimization problem (P1), the objective function is non-concave and the constraints (15b) and (15d) are non-convex. In addition, the optimization variables in the constraint (15b) are coupled. These issues lead to the fact that the solution to the optimization problem (P1) is mathematically intractable. As such, in the following two sections we develop a centralized scheme and two decentralized schemes to design the desired beamforming vectors as approximated solutions to the optimization problem (P1). As we will show in the numerical section, the achieved approximated solution to the centralized scheme can lead to near-optimal beamforming vectors.
IV. CENTRALIZED SCHEME TO JOINTLY DESIGN BEAMFORMING VECTORS
In this section, we jointly design the beamforming vectors for the source, relay, and jammers with the aim to solve the optimization problem (P1). Since (P1) is difficult to tackle directly, we decompose (P1) into two subproblems and solve them alternately until the algorithm converge.
A. SUBPROBLEM 1: DESIGN SOURCE'S BEAMFORMERS
In this subsection, we solve the optimization problem (P1) by fixing the optimization variables v and {w m } M m=1 , i.e., we determine the source's beamforming vectors p and {q l } L l=1 for given beamforming vectors at the relay and jammers.
We note that the objective function of problem (P1) is independent of p and {q l } L l=1 . As such, for given v and {w m } M m=1 , the objective function of problem (P1) can be represented by an arbitrary constant (e.g., a constant 0). Thus, the optimization problem (P1) can be rewritten as
η Tr
We note that the optimization problem (16) is a feasibility problem due to the fact that the objective function is a constant. As such, we only need to find the feasible solution that satisfies all the given constraints. Since (16) is difficult to handle directly, we transform it into the following optimization problem:
where the objective function in the optimization problem (17) denotes the sum of the harvested energy at all the jammers. We note that the feasible solution set to the optimization problem (17) is a subset of that to the optimization problem (16) , since the constraints of these two problems are the same, while the objective function in (16) is a constant but the objective function in (17) depends on the optimization variables (i.e., P and Q). More specifically, the optimal solution to (17) is unique while the solution to (16) is not, thus here we solve (17) in order to find a feasible solution to (16) .
In the following, we are going to find the solution to the optimization problem (17) . By removing the non-convex rank constraint, the SDR of (17) is given by
Since H(θ SR ) is a rank-one matrix, we have
where the inequalities are due to rank(XY) ≤ min{rank(X), rank(Y)}. To proceed, we present the following lemma given in [29] . Lemma 1: If A 0, then the inequality |I+A| ≥ 1+Tr(A) must hold, and the equality holds if and only if rank(A) ≤ 1.
Following Lemma 1 and (19) , the constraint given in (16b) can be rewritten as
whereH SR H H (θ SR )H(θ SR ). We note that (20) is a convex constraint. As such, the optimization problem (18) can be rewritten as
It can be observed that the objective function in the optimization problem (21) is linear and all the constraints are convex. Therefore, (21) is a convex optimization problem, which can be efficiently solved by convex optimization tools such as CVX [30] . We note that, the optimization problem (21) is a relaxed form of the optimization problem (17) . As such, a feasible solution to the optimization problem (21) may not be a feasible solution to the optimization problem (17) . Fortunately, we note that, if the solution to the optimization problem (21) satisfies the rank-one constraint rank(P * ) = 1, then it must also be the solution to the optimization problem (17) . In view of this, it is very critical to check whether the solution to the optimization problem (21) satisfies rank(P * ) = 1. Unfortunately, the solution to the optimization problem (21) may not always guarantee the rank-one constraint, for which the solution to the optimization problem (17) can be identified using the following strategy.
When the rank-one constraint cannot be guaranteed by the solution to the optimization problem (21), we denote the achieved maximum value of the objective function in (21) as E * sum . Then, for a given E * sum , we first solve the following power minimization problem in order to determine the solution to (17): 
To proceed, we present the following two propositions with regard to the solution to the optimization problem (22) .
Proposition 1: The solution to the optimization problem (22) is also the solution to the optimization problem (21) .
Proof:
The detailed proof is presented in Appendix A.
Proposition 2:
The solution to the optimization problem (22) must satisfy the rank-one constraint rank(P * ) = 1.
Proof:
The detailed proof is presented in Appendix B.
We note that Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 guarantee that the solution to the optimization problem (22) is also the solution to the optimization problem (17) , when the solution to the optimization problem (21) does not satisfy the rank-one constraint.
B. SUBPROBLEM 2: DESIGN RELAY AND JAMMERS'S BEAMFORMERS
In this subsection, we solve the optimization problem (P1) by fixing the optimization variables p and {q l } L l=1 , i.e., we determine the relay and jammers' beamforming vectors v and {w m } M m=1 for given beamforming vectors at the source. For given p and {q m } M m=1 , the optimization problem (P1) can be rewritten as
whereR sr
and E m denotes the harvested energy by the m-th jammer, which has been defined in (7) . We note that (23) is a non-convex optimization problem due to the non-concave objective function and the non-convex constraint given in (23b). To solve the optimization problem (23), we introduce the slack variables x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , and y 2 . Then, we can equivalently rewrite the optimization problem (23) as
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We note that the constraints (24b), (24c), (24d), (24e), and (24f) are non-convex, but they are all in the form of the difference between two convex functions. This special form allows us to solve the optimization problem (24) using the SCA technique. To this end, we first tackle the constraints (24b), (24c), and (24f). To proceed, we define
where A 0. Since f A (x) is a convex function with respect to x, we can get the following inequality by performing the first-order Taylor expansion on f A (x) at the pointx [31] :
Using (27), we can convert (24b), (24c), and (24f) into
respectively. It can be seen that the left-hand-side (LHS) of (28), (29) , and (30) are linear functions with respect to optimization variables and their RHS are convex functions. Thus, (28) , (29) , and (30) are convex. Similarly, we can perform the first-order Taylor expansion on (24d) and (24e) at the pointsỹ 1 andỹ 2 , respectively. Therefore, (24d) and (24e) can be transformed into
respectively. According to the above transformations, we can rewrite the optimization problem (24) as
s.t. (28), (29), (30), (31), (32), (24g). (33)
We can see that the objective function in the optimization problem (33) is linear and all constraints are convex. Thus, (33) is a convex optimization problem, which can be efficiently solved by CVX [30] .
C. OVERALL ALGORITHM AND ITS CONVERGENCE
In the last two subsections, we decompose the original optimization problem (P1) into two subproblems and present the methods for solving them. In this subsection, we propose an alternating iteration algorithm to solve the original optimization problem (P1) as the overall algorithm, which is summarized in Algorithm 1. Given v n , {w n m } M m=1 , solve problem (21) and obtain the optimal solution (P n+1 , Q n+1 ). 4: if rank(P n+1 ) > 1 then 5: Solve problem (22) to obtain the rank-one solution. 6: end if 7: Perform SVD on P n+1 and Q n+1 , and obtain p n+1 and
Algorithm 1 Overall Algorithm for Solving Problem (P1)
, solve problem (33) , and obtain v n+1 , w n+1 ; n = n + 1.
9:
Compute the lower bound of secrecy rate R lb s (n). 10: until |R lb s (n) − R lb s (n − 1)| < δ is met, where δ denotes the convergence tolerance.
To prove the convergence of Algorithm 1, we assume that v n , {w n m } M m=1 is the solution to the optimization problem (33) at the n-th iteration, while the achieved maximum value of the objective function is R lb s v n , {w n m } M m=1 . First, for given v n , {w n m } M m=1 in step 3 of Algorithm 1, we solve the optimization problem (17) and obtain the solution as
at the (n + 1)-th itera-
in step 8 of Algorithm 1, by solving the optimization problem (33) we obtain the solution as v n+1 , w n+1 and the maximum objective function as R lb
at the (n + 1)-th iteration. We note that, at the (n + 1)-th iteration,
are feasible/possible solution and the solution to the optimization problem (33), respectively. As such, we have
We note that
are also feasible solutions to the original optimization problem (P1). In addition, the objective function of the original optimization problem (P1) and the optimization problem (33) is the same, which implies that the value of objective function for (P1) and (33) is the same at each iteration. Therefore, following (34) we can conclude that the value of the objective function for (P1) is non-decreasing with respect to the number of iteration in Algorithm 1.
VOLUME 7, 2019

V. TWO DECENTRALIZED SCHEMES TO DESIGN BEAMFORMING VECTORS
In the last section, we developed a centralized scheme to jointly design the beamforming vectors at the source, relay, and jammers. This scheme enables us to design beamforming vectors with high security performance (will be shown in our numerical section), but it occurs a high complexity due to the following two facts. First, the centralized scheme requires each device to share its own information (e.g., channel state information) to a computing centre, such that the computing centre jointly designs the beamforming vectors and distributes them to all the devices. Secondly, the centralized scheme has to solve the semidefinite programming (SDP) problem, which requires iteration and of a high complexity. As such, in this section we develop two decentralized schemes with low complexity to separately design the beamforming vectors for the source, relay, and jammers.
A. DECENTRALIZED SCHEME WITH PARTIAL COOPERATION
In this subsection, we decompose the optimization problem (P1) into three subproblems to separately design the beamforming vectors for each device. Specifically, the source and the each jammer can design their beamforming vectors independently (i.e., without cooperations with any other device), while the design of the beamforming vector at the relay depends on the designed beamforming vectors at the jammers. We thus refer this scheme as the decentralized scheme with partial cooperation.
1) DESIGN SOURCE'S BEAMFORMERS
In the design of the beamforming vectors at the source, we mainly consider the two points as below. Firstly, in order to enable the jammers to create more interference to the eavesdropper in the second time slot, we consider that the jammers will harvest as much energy as possible in the first time slot. Secondly, as discussed in Section II we have to guarantee the constraint R sr ≥ R rd . We note that the constraint R sr ≥ R rd is related to both the beamforming vectors at the source and relay. As such, in order to design the beamforming vectors for the source independently, we have to uncouple the coupling caused by this constraint. To this end, we present an upper bound on R rd as
where the maximum transmit power and the maximum ratio transmission (MRT) are considered at the relay. We note that R u rd is independent of v and {w} M m=1 and the original constraint R sr ≥ R rd must satisfy when R sr ≥ R u rd is guaranteed. Therefore, to design the beamforming vectors for the source independently we replace the constraint R sr ≥ R rd with R sr ≥ R u rd in this subsection. Based on the above discussions, we formulate an optimization problem to maximize the sum harvested energy at all the jammers subject to R sr ≥ R u rd and the transmit power constraint at the source, which is mathematically given by
It should be pointed out that the optimization problem (36) is only a function of the optimization variables p and {q l } L l=1 , which allows us to independently design the beamforming vectors for the source. We note that (36) has a similar form to the optimization problem (17) . Therefore, we can also convert (36) into a standard SDP problem and then find its solution by CVX. However, solving SDP problem generally incurs a high complexity. As such, in the following theorem we present a low-complexity but approximated solution to the optimization problem (36). This solution is developed based on the following two simplifications. The first one is that the source adopts MRT to transmit information signals to the relay. The second one is that the source transmits energy signals in the null space of the channel matrix from the source to the relay in order to eliminate interference caused by the energy signals at the relay, which requires N S > N R .
Theorem 1: Given p = √ P 0p and H SR q l = 0, ∀ l, wherep is the unit eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of the matrixH SR and P 0 is the corresponding power allocation factor, the optimal q l , denoted by q * l , ∀ l, and the optimal P 0 , denoted by P * 0 , are given by
respectively, where F ∈ C N S ×(N S −1) consists of a set of orthogonal basis in the null space of H SR , t denotes the unit eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of the matrix
The detailed proof is provided in Appendix C.
2) DESIGN JAMMERS' BEAMFORMERS
In this subsection, we design the beamforming vector for each jammer. The beamforming vector for the m-th jammer can be written as w m = √ µ mwm , wherew m denotes unit AN beamforming vector and µ m is the corresponding power allocation factor. We note that the jammers intend to transmit AN to significantly confuse the eavesdropper, while leading as small interfere as possible to the destination. From this point of view, we formulate the following optimization problem for the m-th jammer to design its beamforming vector:
where H J m E denotes the covariance matrix of the steering vector h(θ J m E ), the numerator of the objective function denotes the received AN power at the eavesdropper, the first term in the denominator of the objective function denotes the AN power at the destination, E m denotes the harvested energy by the m-th jammer in the first time slot, and the constraint µ m ≤ E m denotes the transmit power constraint at the m-th jammer. In order to determine the optimal power allocation factor µ * m , we equivalently rewrite the optimization problem (39) as
We note that the objective function in the optimization problem (40) is monotonically increasing with respect to µ m for any given beamforming vectorw m . Considering the constraint µ m ≤ E m , we can conclude that the optimal power allocation factor is µ * m = E m . Then, in order to identify the optimal unit beamforming vectorw * m , we rewrite the optimization problem (40) as 
We note that the optimization problem (41) is a standard Rayleigh-Ritz quotient problem [32] . As such, its solution, i.e., the optimal unit beamforming vectorw * m , is the unit eigenvector corresponding to the maximum eigenvalue of the matrix given by
3) DESIGN RELAY'S BEAMFORMER
In this subsection, we design the beamforming vector for the relay, where we have v = √ ρv,v denotes unit information beamforming vector for the relay, and ρ is the corresponding power allocation factor. Our objective is to determine the unit beamforming vectorv and the power allocation factor ρ to maximize the lower bound on the average secrecy rate. To this end, we formulate the following optimization problem:
where the constraint ρ ≤ P R denotes the transmit power constraint at the relay and following (14) the lower bound on the average secrecy rate R lb s can be rewritten as
It can be observed from (44) that R lb s is a function ofw m and µ m , which leads to the fact that the relay has to know the jammers' beamforming strategies when design its beamforming vector. The optimization problem (43) can be equivalently rewritten as max v,ρ
B. DECENTRALIZED SCHEME WITHOUT COOPERATION
In the last subsection, we independently design the beamforming vectors for the source and each jammer, while the design of the relay's beamforming vector requires to know the determined beamforming vectors at the jammers. This requires that all the jammers have to pass the information on the determined beamforming vectors to the relay, which incurs a large cooperation cost (e.g., cooperation delay) between the jammers and the relay. In order to reduce this cost and to enable our proposed scheme being able to be adopted when there is no cooperation between the jammers and relay, following the last subsection we develop a scheme to independently design the beamforming vector at the relay in this subsection. We refer to this scheme as the decentralized scheme without cooperation, where the design of the beamforming vectors at the source and jammers is the same as that in the decentralized scheme with partial cooperation and the design of the beamforming vector at the relay is detailed as below.
Inspired by the optimization problem (39), we can formulate a similar optimization problem to independently design the bemaforming vector at the relay, which is given by
where the numerator in the objective function denotes the received power of the confidential information at the destination, the first term of denominator in the objective function denotes the power of the confidential information leaked to the eavesdropper. Similar to solving the optimization problem (39), the optimal ρ, denoted by ρ * , can be derived as ρ * = P R , and then we can rewrite the optimization problem (51) as
SinceH RD h(θ RD )h H (θ RD ) is a rank-one matrix, the optimal unit beamforming vector, which is the solution to the optimization problem (52), is given by [33] 
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed centralized scheme, decentralized scheme with partial cooperation, and the decentralized scheme without cooperation, which are denoted by 'CS', 'DSWPC' and 'DSWOC', respectively. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed schemes, we consider the numerically achieved solution to the original optimization problem (P1) as the benchmark scheme, which is denoted by 'BMS'. In this benchmark scheme, we perform an exhaustive search on R rd . For each R rd , we employ the Dinkelbach method [34] to convert (P1) into an SDP optimization problem and obtain the maximum value of the objective function for this R rd . We then compare the maximum values of the objective function for all the searched R rd and finally we identify the solution to the optimization problem (P1).
In our simulations, we consider that the angle estimation error follows a uniform distribution. Specifically, θ RE and θ J m E are assumed to follow the uniform distribution over the interval [− θ max , θ max ], where θ max is the maximum estimation error [24] . Then, the probability density distribution function of θ is given by
where
The covariance matrix can be accordingly calculated as [24] H
where ab ∈ {RE, In Fig. 2 , we plot the maximum average secrecy rates achieved by different schemes versus the maximum transmit power of the relay. In this figure, as expected we first observe that the CS scheme outperforms the DSWPC and DSWOC schemes in terms of achieving a higher average secrecy rate. This is due to the fact that in the CS scheme we jointly design the beamforming vectors for the source, relay, and jammers, while in the DSWPC and DSWOC schemes the design is not fully joint. As such, we can see that the superiority of the CS scheme is achieved at the cost of a higher complexity. In addition, we observe that the DSWPC scheme achieves a higher average secrecy rate than the DSWOC scheme, which is due to the fact that in the DSWPC scheme the design of the beamforming vectors at the jammers and relay is cooperative, while this design is non-cooperative. Finally, in this figure we observe that our developed CS scheme can achieve similar performance as the numerically obtained (via exhaustive search) BMS scheme, which directly demonstrates the excellent performance of the CS scheme.
In Fig. 3 , we plot the maximum average secrecy rates achieved by different schemes versus the number of antennas at each self-sustained jammer. In this figure, we first observe that the average secrecy rate increases with N J , which is due to the following two facts. First, as N J increases, each jammer can harvest more energy in the first time slot and thus the jammers can generate more interference to the eavesdropper in the second time slot. Secondly, each jammer can create a narrower beam with more transmit antennas, which allows the jammers to more accurately interfere with the eavesdropper and create less interference to the destination. In this figure, we also observe that the performance gap between the DSWOC scheme and DSWPC scheme increases with N J , which can be explained as follows. In the DSWPC scheme, the design of the relay's beamforming vector requires the cooperation from each jammer, while this design is independent of each jammer's beamforming vector in the DSWOC scheme. As N J increases, the relay requires more information from each jammer due to this cooperation, which should lead to a larger cooperation gain. We also note that the complexity gap between these two schemes also increases with N J , since sharing each jammer's beamforming vector to the relay occurs a larger amount of exchanging information as N J increases.
In Fig. 4 , we plot the maximum average secrecy rates achieved by different schemes versus the maximum transmit power of the source. In this figure, we first observe that the performance gap between the DSWOC and DSWPC schemes increases as N R or P S increases. The reason is similar to that for the observation found in Fig. 3 . Specifically, as P S increases each jammer can harvest more energy and thus sharing its beamforming vector to the relay in the DSWPC scheme can lead to a larger performance gain relative to not sharing this information in the DSWOC scheme. Meanwhile, as N R increases the relay can utilized the shared information from each jammer more efficiently in the DSWPC scheme, which enables a larger cooperation gain between the jammers and the relay. In this figure, we also observe that the maximum average secrecy rate achieved by the DSWOC scheme does not increase as fast as those achieved by the CS and DSWPC schemes with respect to P S .
In Fig. 5 , we plot the maximum average secrecy rate versus the maximum angle estimation error θ max . In this figure, in addition to consider our proposed three schemes (referred to as the robust schemes), we also consider the corresponding non-robust schemes, in which the estimated angles to the eavesdropper are taken as the true angles and the covariance matrices of the channels to the eavesdropper are not taken into account in the design of beamforming vectors at the source, relay, and jammers. As expected, in this figure we VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 5. Maximum average secrecy rate versus the maximum angle estimation error for P S = 30 dBm, P R = 30 dBm, N R = 4, and N J = 4.
first observe that the maximum achieved average secrecy rate decreases with θ max for all the schemes. In addition, we observe that the maximum average secrecy rate achieved by the robust schemes decreases more slowly with respect to θ max than that achieved by the non-robust schemes. This shows that the proposed design of the beamforming vectors is more robust to the angle estimation errors and also shows the significance to take the statistical nature of the angle estimation errors into account in the design of these beamforming vectors. We note that in practice the angle estimation errors always exist and thus we can conclude that the proposed design of beamforming vectors is of a significant importance in practice.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, for the first time we introduced self-sustained jammers into a DM relay system to enhance physical layer security. To this end, we first developed the CS scheme to obtain the near-optimal beamforming vectors at the source, relay, and jammers, which is of a high cost and complexity, since it requires the full cooperation between these devices and the incurred optimized problem is solved with the aid of SDR and SCA techniques together with an alternating iterative algorithm. To reduce the cost and complexity of the CS scheme, we also developed two low-complexity schemes, i.e., the DSWPC and DSWOC schemes, which only requires partial cooperation and non-cooperation between the devices. Our examination demonstrates that the three schemes can balance well between the system complexity and performance, while provides practical implementation significance in designing these beamforming vectors. Furthermore, our results show that the three schemes are robust to the angle estimation errors, which always exist in practical DM systems.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Suppose that (P * , Q * ) is the optimal solution to problem (22) . It is easy to verify that (P * , Q * ) also satisfies all the constraints of problem (21) , which means that (P * , Q * ) is a feasible solution to problem (21) . Therefore, we have
Combining (22b) and (56) yields
Therefore, (P * , Q * ) is also the optimal solution to the problem (21) , which completes the proof.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Since problem (22) is a convex optimization problem and satisfies Slater's condition [30] , the optimal solution must satisfy Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. The Lagrange dual function of problem (22) is given by (58), which is shown at the top of next page, where ν, {λ m } M m=1 , 1 , 2 , S 1 , and S 2 are the dual variables associated with the constraints in (22) . The KKT conditions related to the proof are listed as follows.
where (P * , Q * ) are the optimal primal optimization variables, (ν * , {λ * m } M m=1 , * 1 , * 2 , S * 1 , S * 2 ) are the optimal dual optimization variables.
Substituting (59a) into (59b), we have
Multiplying both sides of (60) by P * and invoking the equation S * 1 P * = 0, yield: * 1R rdHSR P * = I N S + S * 2 P * .
Since H(θ SR ) is a rank-one matrix, the rank ofH SR is 1.
Considering that I N S + S * 2 is a positive matrix (full rank matrix), we have 
where the inequality is due to the fact that rank(XY) ≤ min{rank(X), rank(Y)}. However, if rank(P * ) = 0, then P * = 0, which implies that there is no confidential messages transmitted from the source. Therefore, we conclude that rank(P * ) = 1, which completes the proof.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Since we assume that the energy beamforming vectors {q l } L l=1 are all in the null space of the channel H SR to eliminate the interference of the energy signals to the DF relay, i.e., H SR q l = 0, ∀l, it follows that q l = Fq l , ∀l, where F ∈ C N S ×(N S −1) consists of a set of orthogonal basis in the null space of H SR , andq l ∈ C (N S −1)×1 is an arbitrary complex vector. In addition, the rate at the DF relay can be expressed as R sr = log 2 1 + P 0 σ 2p HH SRp . In the following, we first find the optimal q l , denoted by q * l , and then find the optimal P 0 , denoted by P * 0 . For givenp and P * 0 , problem (36) can be rewritten as
It is not difficult to observe that the power constraint in problem (63) must hold with equality at the optimal solution, for otherwiseq l can be scaled up properly to improve the objective value without violating the constraints. Therefore, we can equivalently rewrite problem (63) as
Definingq l √ p lxl , where x l ∈ C (N S −1)×1 is an arbitrary unit complex vector, and p l is its corresponding power allocation factor. Problem (64) can be rewritten as 
Based on the above derivations and discussions, we have q * 1 = P S − P * 0 Ft, and {q * l } L l=2 = 0. In the following, we aim to find the optimal power allocation factor P * 0 . To this end, we substitute {q * l } L l=1 into problem (36) and rewrite it as The feasible set of the problem (68) can be expressed as
Obviously, the feasible set D is a compact convex set. In addition, it can be observed that problem (68) is a univariate linear program. As such, the optimal solution of problem (68) can be expressed as This completes the proof. VOLUME 7, 2019 
